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I. Introduction
This article is about sex; but not about sex meaning gender, an adjective, or “that thing we are.” 1  It is about sexual behavior.
It is, in Professor Franke's words, about sex as verb--“that thing we do” 2 --or, to quote Judge Posner, it *602  is about that
“quintessential private activity [of] our culture.” 3  However, it does not focus on sex as “the ultimate animal necessity.” 4  That
would be the realm of today's talk shows headed by Jerry Springer 5  and his ilk. Instead, it focuses on the pervasiveness of
sexual discourse in the legal realm and tries to explain the reason behind it.
*603  This article suggests that sex has become a human behavior that is often legally sanctioned because it offers itself to
endless and various permissive and restrictive regulations. Furthermore, policing sex requires little infrastructure, 6  unlike, say,
a war in Iraq or improving the public school system. Allowing permissive sex legislation is also less expensive. Moreover,
like thirst and hunger and irrespective of any regulation, sex will continue its old ways, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
reproductive or amative. 7
Self-labeled progressives have initiated sexually-oriented legislation in order to further a more tolerant and, thus, democratic
society through the creation of new individual rights with a sexual content. Individual rights, such as the right for nonprocreative,
contraceptive, marital intercourse that was recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 8  do seem to create
a more democratic society by increasing an individual's sphere of non-governmental interference. 9  Further, in a society in
which the quest for socio-economic equality has come to a halt, 10  sexual equality seems to represent the most progressive
goal that one can reach.
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*604  Conservatives, on the other hand, have used sexually-oriented legislation to create a chimera of social order and
predictability. 11  They prescribe abstinence through both criminal and civil law. 12  For example, by criminalizing obscenity
and policing sexual expression deemed inappropriate, they purport to promote public peace for the benefit of the entire
community. 13
Sometimes the line between the progressives' and the conservatives' social agenda is blurred. At times, both favor policing
sexuality and then both claim victory when such laws are enacted. This is the case with Megan's Laws 14  that require sexual
offenders to notify the communities in which they live of their presence. 15  Similarly, Title VII, which prohibits sexual
harassment, answers conservative goals--barring any sexuality at work. 16
Because sex offers a never-ending source of liberal and conservative rules, sexual legal discourse is pervasive today. Regulating
sex offers both illusory freedom and illusory order. There are many aspects of sex that can be barred, policed, or encouraged.
The more aspects of sex that can be regulated, the more results that will be obtained. The more results obtained, the more
victories for which credit can be taken.
Furthermore, as political eye candy, sex and its regulations are not geared to generate any irreversible change in the basic social
or political structure. For example, regarding the rules about bankruptcy filings, the 2001 bankruptcy bill's main economic
impact was to help preserve the status quo for American have-nots. 17  The purpose of the bill was to amend the Bankruptcy
Code by making illegal anti-abortion acts nondischargeable. Despite the fact *605  that this proposed change was the result of
a compromise with Rep. Henry Hyde, “a leading opponent of abortion,” 18  the republican rank and file opposed the measure
and killed the bill in the House. 19  Otherwise, the amended Bankruptcy Code, “sought for years by credit-card companies,
banks and retailers,” would have become legislation with bipartisan support from republicans as well as liberal democrats, such
as Senator Hillary Clinton. 20
This article is divided into three parts. The first part will attempt to demonstrate the pervasiveness of heterosexual and
homosexual legal discourse 21  by showing how legislative 22  or judicial discourse satisfies the need for minor social changes,
while inadvertently pacifying the need for dramatic socio-economic changes. In light of the famous “footnote 4,” 23  liberal
scholars may consider legal discourse a more appropriate mechanism for promoting liberal change on behalf of “discrete and
insular minorities.” 24  While that may have been true for the judiciary then because the legislature seemed to take good care of
the economic interests of the have-nots, today, in the heyday of neo-laissez-faire liberalism, neglecting such issues at either level
could lead to the death of politics within a well-differentiated, dual party system. 25  For example, ignoring economic issues
in the 2002 mid-term elections, but promoting the reproductive rights difference, probably cost the democrats a hemorrhagic
loss of seats in the House and Senate. 26  I will thus attempt to *606  show how specific sexually-oriented, individual rights,
such as the right to choose “to bear or beget a child” promote liberal (progressive) social change, using Hegel's' theory of ius
personale, 27  its Marxist critique, 28  and Dworkin's theory of individual legal rights. 29  The second part will then show how
specific sexually-oriented legislation, such as obscenity laws and Megan's Laws, promote conservative social change. Finally,
the third part will illustrate how liberals' promotion of Title VII legislation inadvertently satisfies a socially conservative agenda
banning all sexual discourse from the work place.
II. The Pervasiveness of Sexual Legal discourse
A. Overview
The realm of sexual legal discourse covers all laws with sexual content. The well-accepted principle of the Rule of Law 30
legitimizes legal rules and their social effect. 31  Accordingly, all changes regarding sex--often defined as a “peculiarly personal
and private activity” 32  or a fundamental and basic drive 33 --when obtained through a legal process (whether judicial or
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legislative), are deemed to fall under the same presumption of legitimacy. 34  *607  Sexually-oriented federal and state laws
are quite abundant today. 35  They seem to face less opposition when they provide new individual rights and are easily accepted
when they proscribe individual sexual behavior. 36
Within the American democratic tradition, both progressive and conservative social change are promoted through laws. 37
Abstract individual rights 38  focused on sexuality then become individual rights with sexual content. 39  Liberals sponsor
individual rights that sanction concrete aspects of sexuality, such as the right to abortion; 40  the right to have the cost of *608
contraceptives covered by health insurance; 41  the right to have transgender procedures (sex change operations) covered by
health insurance; 42  and the right to be in a civil union. 43  These rights can exist at the federal or municipal level. For example,
urban entities enacted domestic partnership laws 44  that ensure certain sexual freedoms for people in domestic partnerships. 45
Through such individual rights, liberals seek to create an acceptable substitute for an overarching individual right to sexual
freedom 46  and to ensure that basic freedom for all.
Conservatives usually reach their goals by sponsoring legislation that polices individual behavior and prohibits individual
liberties in the name of community moral and religious interests. This article contends that people allow such “policing” because
it is perceived to be in the public interest and to promote a collective interest in community moral standards. For example, the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 47  and the Child Online Protection Act, 48  which invented Internet policing, purported to
protect such community interests *609  at the federal level. 49  At the state level, under a similar guise, obscenity law--“a set of
juridical procedures and categories that have been developing in tandem with the governmental ‘policing’ of modern populations
since the early eighteenth century” 50 --punishes sexual obscenity 51  as a crime against public decency and morals. 52
Another sexual regulation that is currently popular and promotes a socially conservative agenda at both the federal and local
level is “abstinence unless married” education. 53  Such programs 54  have been enacted at both levels in a triumph of abstinence-
unless-married pedagogy and as “the culmination of two decades' work by the religious right.” 55  In a new attempt to buttress
this untenable position, the current republican administration is sponsoring and heavily promoting a federal (early) marriage
program. 56
Another way the conservative right uses state and federal legislation to control sexual legal discourse is through zoning
ordinances. Local zoning ordinances that bar adult motion picture theaters from residential zones and areas near churches, parks,
or schools appear to be thriving. 57  They purport to protect school children, churchgoers, and the owners of the surrounding
*610  property 58  while promoting the conservative agenda 59  of prohibiting individual sexual rights.
For example, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 60  the Supreme Court acknowledged that such local ordinances
violate an individual's First Amendment right to view films “describing or relating to ‘specified sexual activities' or ‘specified
anatomical areas.”’ 61  However, because the ordinance purportedly protected collective interests, such as “the quality of urban
life” by preventing crime and property depreciation, the Supreme Court upheld it and endorsed the conservative social agenda
it promoted. 62
The Court balanced the sexual individual rights at issue--mostly First Amendment rights--with the prohibitive collective
interests and found the individual rights incompatible with a certain standard of “quality of life in the community at large.” 63
It is worth noting the clear ideological split between the conservative and the liberal justices. Only the liberal Justices Brennan
and Marshall dissented from the “policing” majority opinion while the other justices joined in or concurred with Justice
Rehnquist's 64  conservative majority opinion. 65
Also abundant are laws that criminalize rape and sodomy. Purportedly, they promote order as they punish those violent acts.
Indeed, to the extent that both rape 66  and sodomy 67  are violent felonies that imply criminal assault, their *611  punishment
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is legitimized by the asexual, collective interest to a peaceful environment. However, when sexual intercourse between two
consenting persons 68  becomes rape just because the “victim” is not quite seventeen years old, 69  the only protected interest
is society's interest in policing sexuality. 70  Similarly, laws requiring sexual offenders to submit themselves to the public
humiliation of community notification on release from prison 71  have been very popular as of late and seem to answer a political
agenda as well as a collective interest in sexual policing.
In “Sex Crimes and the New Punitiveness,” John Pratt discussed the dynamism of sexual legal discourse and its connection
with social conservative needs. 72  He viewed the punitiveness of sexual behavior within the last two decades as a response to a
socially conservative agenda. 73  Pratt noted that “Welfarism [and] its commitment to inclusivity and equality of opportunity,” 74
*612  as well as its interests in eradicating “poverty, ill health, and unemployment,” 75  have been replaced with neo-liberalism
and its “political economy of victimization” 76  based on individuals' increased feelings of “vulnerability and anxiety.” 77  In
Pratt's words, neoliberalism is based on the belief that while everything is possible for the individual, the results are ephemeral
and continuously open to attack by random “Monsters who lurk in the shadows of everyday life.” 78  The death of tolerance and
inclusiveness within the welfare state gave way to individual anxiety brought about by neoliberalist individualism. 79
Pratt tied the profound economic and social changes of the last two decades to a shift in North American cultural sensitivities. 80
He then connected the latter to the dramatic shift toward criminal punishment of sexual behavior and explained that mass-
mediatized, neo-liberal anxiety demanded the new penal punishment of sexually-related crimes. 81  The new type of punishment
answered and promoted conservative social demands. 82  Responding to and furthering the social demands, the new punishment
took the form of non-Western and pre-modern ways of social punishment that supplanted limited jail sentences with unlimited
shaming punishment. 83  Such examples are surgical or chemical castration, 84  public ostracism required by Megan's Law, 85
*613  or the stringent release conditions current sex offenders face after long prison sentences. 86
However, Pratt stopped here. He did not observe the public pervasiveness of sexual discourse and did not question its rationale.
He did not inquire whether sexual legal discourse can promote demands for both conservative and progressive social change
and he did not inquire how such a role would be possible. In brief, he did not attempt to explain how and why sexual legal
discourse satisfies both ends of the political spectrum.
This article complements Pratt's analysis and suggests that sexual legal discourse satisfies both a liberal agenda through
permissive individual rights with a sexual content and a conservative agenda through repressive sexual legislation. As shown
below, both agendas thrive on incrementalism. 87  Since there are so many aspects of sexuality that can be regulated, everybody
can claim satisfaction with each new right or piece of prohibitive legislation for a long time to come. Moreover, legal rules that
repress sexual behavior and accordingly establish individual duties of abstinence, such as the law of sexual harassment, satisfy
both progressive and conservative social demands.
B. Permissive Individual Sexual Rights v. Repressive Sexual Legislation
It has become popular to use sexual laws to further social change whether through permissive individual rights or repressive
legislation. However, historically, English common law 88  deferred many aspects of human sexuality to ecclesiastical
courts. 89  Those courts faced the daunting task of repressing sexual behavior outside of marriage. 90  Only the Puritans of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony 91  used laws to punish extra-marital sex and they chose to do so by defining adultery as a capital
crime. 92  It should be noted that people remained undeterred despite such a threat. 93
*614  Liberals promote social change through the adoption of new, specific individual rights. 94  An individual right is a state
protected or enforceable behavior or interest that enables its owner to claim the court's protection when it is violated. 95  This
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definition stresses both the content of a right (the specific human behavior often emphasized within the European individual
rights tradition) 96  and the more American, court enforcement aspect.
As underscored by Justinian's definition of rights, 97  rights seem to empower people vis-à-vis other people, things, or actions. 98
However, as Hegel rightfully showed, individual rights only exist as relations between the individual and the State because the
State approves them. 99  Moreover, to the extent that they exist only within a system and not outside it, as Marx noted, rights
are closer to an illusion than to real empowerment. 100
However, Marx did not appear to understand the power of abstract constructs, which seem to be the very attraction of any theory
of rights. When people receive something that they did not have before, because it is abstract, they cannot gauge its limits.
Ultimately, they feel more empowered. Court protection for a specific sexual behavior, especially when it does not require any
infrastructure, such as the right to engage in consensual sexual acts between same sex partners, is far from being a mere abstract
concept. However, it should be noted that when the right received requires payment for the service involved, such as paying
for abortion services, court protection achieves little if the beneficiary cannot afford that service. 101
Individual fundamental rights are important in the American democratic tradition because they, and not people barricading
themselves in the streets (as described by Victor Hugo 102 ), are perceived to promote change. 103  As “things *615  that permit
individuals to act in certain ways” 104  against the Government, 105  or as “constraints on the kinds of reasons that government
may legitimately act upon,” 106  their democratic role is clear. Having more concrete sexual individual rights certainly ensures
the success of a progressive social agenda. The Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for example, ensure citizens a
mechanism for protecting and enforcing their fundamental individual rights and liberties. 107
Sexually-related individual rights are hard-fought, court-created privacy rights 108  that fall within the legal framework offered
by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 109  Justice Douglas stated that
procreation is “one of the basic civil rights of man,” 110  as it is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.” 111  Sometimes courts have enlarged the realm of individual rights by only extending the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 112  or by applying the guaranties offered by the Bill of Rights. 113  For example, in Griswold v. State of
Connecticut, 114  the Court recognized the right of marital privacy, which includes the right to use contraceptives. The Griswold
Court *616  stated: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” 115
The fight for individual rights extends to state legislatures and courts. The Supreme Court of Vermont, in Baker v. Vermont, 116
endorsed same-sex civil unions by holding that state laws excluding same-sex couples from benefits and protection incident to
marriage violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. 117
However, the strategy of obtaining new rights in order to promote a specific social agenda is not only a tedious process, but
often a fruitless one. For example, on the issue of reproductive rights, while the Supreme Court established one's right to
obtain contraceptives in Griswold, 118  that right was limited by inconsistent state provisions regarding economic coverage for
contraceptives. 119  The Supreme Court also acknowledged one's right to choose an abortion, but economic deterrence, lack of
money to pay for the medical procedure, and the existence of a doctor's right not to perform abortions 120  could be as much of
an impediment to abortions as the previous lack of a right to choose.
Ironically, as sexually-related individual rights promote a liberal agenda and “sexual freedom,” 121  the “right to liberty”
debate 122  has spawned laws *617  suppressing sex and promoting a conservative agenda. 123  As shown in this article, there
seems to be a conservative answer to the inevitable gap that exists between theoretical moral discourse and how it translates
into the lives of people 124  since conservatives also promote social change through legal means. 125  Lately, this gap has been
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successfully filled with sexually prohibitive legislation in the name of the silent majority, 126  directed at changing individuals'
behavior. 127
III. Promoting Conservative Social Change Through Specific Sexually-Oriented Legislation
A. The Individual Right to Freely Choose Whether “to bear or beget a child”
Abortion law is a classic example of how sexual legal discourse has been used to promote both a socially conservative agenda
by criminalizing abortions and a liberal agenda by recognizing abortion rights--the right to freely choose whether “to bear or
beget a child.” 128
The abortion discourse has a long history as a tool to simultaneously promote both agendas. Until the mid-nineteenth
century, 129  criminal *618  punishment for abortion co-existed 130  with a limited right to abortion 131  under which abortions
could be easily induced by a physician, midwife, or anyone without penalty, 132  so long as before “quickening.” 133
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the abortion discourse was limited to the promotion of socially conservative
goals. 134  The individual right to choose an abortion disappeared in favor of the collective interest to police sexuality and ensure
public health. 135  Abortion became exclusively subject to criminal law. 136
Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th century and to
justify their continued existence. It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern
to discourage illicit sexual conduct.... [In addition,] it has been argued that a State's real concern in enacting a criminal abortion
law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious
jeopardy....The third reason is the State's interest--some phrase it in terms of duty--in protecting prenatal life. 137
The progressive social movements of the 20th century incorporated sexual freedom as one of their goals. As a consequence,
reproductive rights--the *619  right protecting “the interest in reproductive autonomy” 138 -- became the paradigm of American
liberalism, which limited itself to equating social change with legal change.
In 1970, Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington repealed their statutes criminalizing abortion. 139  Taking note of these
changes, the Supreme Court started to specifically include individual rights that promoted sexual freedom in the fundamental
right to privacy. 140
First, the Supreme Court recognized a married woman's right to contraceptives. In Griswold, 141  the plaintiff was convicted
under state law of giving contraception information to married couples. 142  In Connecticut, it was a statutory crime to use or to
teach the use of contraceptives. 143  The Court found that statute unconstitutional and held that the right to privacy was “older
than the Bill of Rights[,] older than our political parties, older than our school system” 144  and covered a married woman's
right to contraceptives. 145
Next, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 146  the Court held that the reproductive lives of men and women are a private area free from
government regulation. 147  Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held that “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 148
Liberals pushed the legal battle further, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment, because it asserts that “no state” shall interfere
with the people's liberties, should be interpreted as to include “the freedom of women to decide on abortions without interference
by the state.” 149  At last, a sympathetic fact *620  pattern arose and the Supreme Court decided in favor of a woman's individual
right to choose an abortion. 150
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In Roe v. Wade, 151  the individual plaintiff claimed to be an unmarried woman who had been gang raped and was unable to
obtain an abortion. 152  Under century-old Texas statute, it was a felony for anyone to destroy an embryo or fetus, except for
the purpose of saving the life of the mother on medical advice. 153  The plaintiff challenged the statute denying her an abortion,
claiming equal protection, due process, and the right to privacy. 154
[The] attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose
to terminate her pregnancy....[This right is alleged to exist] in the concept of personal “liberty” embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in the personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of
Rights or its penumbras...or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment. 155
The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and found in favor of an individual reproductive right. 156  The Court
construed that right in light of the common law historic precedent, the Ninth 157  and Fourteenth Amendments, 158  and “a right
to privacy that is not explicitly written into the Constitution,” 159  but was recognized by the Griswold Court. 160
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, *621  as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 161
However, the Court eventually granted the plaintiff a flawed individual right--one pregnant with collective interests. 162  It held
that a woman's right to choose was absolute only in the first trimester, after which the state's interests prevailed. 163  Gradually,
the state interest becomes more compelling, starting with protecting the mother's health in the second trimester and, in the
third trimester, protecting the viable fetus. 164  The Court finally held that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.” 165
With Roe, the Court pushed the abortion discourse to the battlefront of social change. It again became a potential promoter of
both conservative and progressive agendas. It encouraged a liberal agenda by advancing the freedom of individual choice 166
and it encouraged a conservative agenda by advancing the state's interest in the health of the mother and the fetus after
viability. 167  The latter position would soon become known as the “right-to-life” 168  position, which stands for the fetus's right
to life (a collective interest until the fetus becomes an individual) 169  and opposes the liberals' “right to choose,” which stands
for a woman's right to choose to bear a child.
*622  During the 1960s movement era, abortion faced “public moralization” 170  and, with the advent of the “right-to-life”
versus “right to choose” conflict, became a major issue of public debate. 171  In fact, the debate over abortion became so
absorbing that:
Never, since the final shot of the Civil War, over a century and a quarter ago, has American society been faced
with an issue so polarizing and, at the same time, so totally incapable of either rational discussion or compromise,
as is the ongoing controversy . . . over the legality of attempts by the State to regulate abortion--the act of
voluntarily terminating a pregnancy, prior to full term. 172
The arguable success of Roe meant the beginning of a new phase for the liberal movement--a defensive one 173  that left the
conservatives in the spotlight. This new reality was mirrored in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 174  The Casey Court addressed
abortion from a conservative position. 175  It balanced collective interests versus individual rights, as if the first were more
or equally important. 176  Thus, it found that Pennsylvania's informed consent law did not unconstitutionally interfere with a
woman's right to choose. 177  By statute, Pennsylvania required a woman to receive extensive review of the abortion procedure
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at least twenty-four hours before the scheduled abortion. 178  This requirement clearly gave preference to the collective or state's
interest in each pregnancy. 179  The Court reached its decision not by using the “compelling interest” (strict scrutiny standard)
of Roe, 180  but the “undue burden” standard on pre-viability abortion. 181
“Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, who authored the decisive joint opinion,” 182  claimed to have reaffirmed “the
essential core of Roe” 183 --a woman's right to decide whether or not to abort a non-viable fetus. (Four *623  justices argued
that Roe should be overruled 184  while only two argued to reapply it). 185  The Casey Court changed the terms of a woman's
right to abort by restricting it in favor of the collective interest in a woman's health 186  and legalized state interference with a
woman's right to choose. 187  The Court justified this intrusion with the State's interest in protecting a woman's physical and
psychological well being. 188  It held that the State had an interest in informing the woman about the “health risks of abortion and
childbirth” 189  and insuring that she would not discover later, “with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision
was not fully informed.” 190
Despite recognizing Roe's “core” of abortion rights, 191  the Casey Court narrowed Roe's holding 192  by discarding as dicta the
“fundamental rights” language 193  that the Roe Court used to describe abortion rights. 194  Furthermore, it rejected Roe's rigid
trimester framework, giving states more authority to limit abortion. 195  The state's interest, recognized by Casey, permeated
the previously absolute individual right that a woman enjoyed under Roe during her first trimester of pregnancy. 196
The more recent history of the abortion discourse further shows that fighting for individual rights in order to obtain social
change, even if the change does not challenge the system, is a cumbersome process.
The short-term consequences of constitutionalizing the abortion issue were powerful and positive for the pro-choice movement.
The long-term consequences were disastrous. Roe v. Wade provided the religious right and the conservative wing of the
Republican Party one of the best organizing tools and rallying cries imaginable. The right-to-life movement was *624
energized by this decision and became one of the potent political forces both nationally and in a large number of states. At the
same time, the pro-choice movement became lethargic, celebrating its great judicial victory and neglecting the hard work of
organizing and fund-raising--at least in the beginning. 197
The abortion saga illustrates that obtaining social change through new individual rights is a never-ending process. First, rights
established through the judiciary process are imperfect. For example, the Roe Court did not give the feminist movement what
they asked. 198  In spite of amici briefs, the Court did not uphold a woman's inalienable right to control all her bodily functions,
“as it affected pregnancy, gestation, and childbirth.” 199  Second, even to the extent that they are recognized, those rights are
susceptible to change in concert with the Court's ideological adjustments. 200  The right to choose an abortion established in
Roe was modified by Casey, reflecting changes in the ideological composition of the Court; 201  although, as mentioned before,
the adjustments were not too dramatic. 202  Finally, judicially created rights may potentially be hollow. Without an economic
requirement, such as payment for abortion services, abortion rights are shallow victories for those who cannot afford those
services. 203
Currently, whether as a result of Roe or not, 204  liberals and conservatives seem deadlocked in the abortion debate. In
1998-1999, for example, their battle crossed ideological lines, 205  as only forty-one percent of republicans and *625  fifty-one
percent of democrats opposed such a right, 206  while, in the same year, the majority of the U.S. population favored a limited
individual right to an abortion. 207  In addition, the recent legislative debate surrounding the bankruptcy bill shows the political
impact that the abortion discourse continues to have, as it has stopped the republican-lead House from further damaging the
socio-economic situation of American have-nots who did not support the bill's passage. 208
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B. The Individual Right to Engage in Private, Consensual Sexual Acts Between Same Sex Adults
Whether called sodomy 209  and criminalized or consensual sexual acts between same sex adults and fought for as a future
individual right, this discourse has also been used to promote both a socially conservative and *626  liberal agenda. Historically,
it promoted only a socially conservative agenda since consensual acts between same-sex partners were covered by criminal
laws. 210  Such laws were legitimized by a collective interest in policing sexuality and repressing individuals in their search
for sexual happiness. 211  This conservative approach appeared to have answered public calls, for prohibiting hedonistic sexual
acts--whether by the state, public opinion, or religion--while it utterly disregarded any potential common gain in “the good of
friendship by engaging in sexual intercourse that is not open to procreation.” 212
In 1986, the Supreme Court chose to speak on this issue, although the lower court had ruled in favor of an individual right to
allow consensual sex between same-sex adults. 213  In Bowers v. Hardwick, 214  the Court made a conservative decision which
“almost obsessive[ly] focus[ed] on homosexual activity,” 215  to the exclusion of other issues. 216  Essentially, the Court found
that homosexuals did not possess a constitutionally protected right to engage in private, consensual, same-sex acts. 217
Respondent Hardwick, who had been charged with committing sodomy under a Georgia state statute 218  for having engaged in
consensual, same-sex acts with another adult male in the bedroom of his home, brought suit in federal district court, challenging
that statute's constitutionality. 219  He lost at the *627  district court level and appealed. 220  The Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the Georgia statute had violated Hardwick's fundamental rights. 221
The Supreme Court granted the state's petition for certiorari. Justice White, a Kennedy appointee 222  writing for a 5-4
majority, 223  delivered the Court's “vigorously written opinion.” 224  Applying the “rational basis” standard, the Court “rejected
the argument that notions of morality held by the Georgia electorate did not provide a sufficiently rational basis” 225  and
found the state statute at issue constitutional. 226  The Court pointed out that sodomy was traditionally considered a crime in
all states and that to assert that a right to engage in consensual, anal or oral sexual acts was deeply rooted in history was, “at
best, facetious.” 227  Thus, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 228  the Supreme Court held that there was no right to engage in private,
consensual acts of, what the court poignantly called, “homosexual sodomy.” 229
It is worth noting, as Professor Thomas pointed out, that there is a “problematic persistence” of the religious word “sodomy”
in connection with “the medical term ‘homosexual”’ throughout the entire opinion. 230  He suggested that the “parasitic
relationship” between the two terms, especially in view of the historical, religious meaning of “sodomy,” as derived from the
Old Testament city of Sodom, and the meaning of “homosexual,” which is of  *628  secular and more recent provenience, is
another example of the “regnant biases” that are found in Bowers. 231
Two decades later, however, same-sex partners enjoy similar benefits to heterosexual married couples in some geographical
areas of the United States. When the Vermont State Supreme Court, in Baker v. Vermont, 232  held that homosexuality is not a
bar to receiving benefits similar to those offered by marriage, 233  it clearly acknowledged that the state of Vermont recognized
the right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts between same sex adults.
Going one step further, the Vermont Legislature addressed this implied right and eventually adopted a comprehensive domestic
partnership scheme, “a sort of separate-but-operationally-equal legal status.” 234  The Vermont House of Representatives passed
“An Act Relating to Civil Unions” 235  and the Governor signed it into law. 236  The Act, which specifies that “Parties to a civil
union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law...as are granted to spouses in a marriage,” 237
ensures that the legal status of “domestic partnership” is virtually identical to marriage. 238  Adults, at least in Vermont, have
a limited right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts. 239  However, since this right was achieved as part of a package,
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i.e., “the secular benefits and protections offered [to] married couples,” this right for homosexuals is defined by heterosexual
marriage. 240  It is undeniably limited to *629  those who enter civil unions, which brings to mind the same, old no pre-marital
or extra-marital sex prohibitions.
This tolerant trend started by the Vermont court was continued by the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 241
which ensured sexual freedom for all same-sex partners. 242  The Vermont court stated that “The issue before the Court,
moreover, does not turn on the religious or moral debate over intimate same-sex relationships, but rather on the statutory and
constitutional basis for the exclusion of same-sex couples from the secular benefits and protections offered married couples.” 243
On December 2, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Lawrence certiorari. 244  Unlike in Bowers, Lawrence was granted
certiorari on the defendants' appeal and the lower court upheld the state statute that criminalizes homosexual acts. 245  The
Bowers Court granted the Attorney General's petition for certiorari, questioning the holding that the sodomy statute violated
the fundamental rights of homosexuals, 246  which was construed against the individual “freedom of intimate association.” 247
Unlike in Bowers, the main argument in Lawrence was whether the Petitioners' convictions under the Texas “Homosexual
Conduct Statute” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 248  In Bowers, Powell's decisive vote was
won because the Petitioners' argument was based solely on a sexually-oriented individual right instead of an argument based
on the Eighth Amendment. 249  Delivering the Court's decision in Lawrence, 250  Justice Kennedy chose to focus on individual
freedoms by defining “the liberty of all” rather than curtailing *630  them under the Court's “own moral code,” 251  as Bowers
did. In Lawrence, the Court found that absent any legitimate state interest, there was no justification for statutory “intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual.” 252  Thus, the Court overruled Bowers 253  and reversed the lower court's
decision in Lawrence. 254
All of these issues re-emphasize the role that sexual legal discourse fulfills by promoting opposite interests as well as the never-
ending nature of achieving social change through legal change. It is also worth noting that judicial or legislative acknowledgment
of the right to engage in consensual sexual acts between same-sex partners would help to eradicate this specific discrimination.
Progressive social change would then be palpable and the victory real, not shallow, as is the case with the abortion issue whose
solution requires both decriminalization and payment for abortion services. Without addressing the economic aspect of abortion
rights, the victory achieved there seems closer to the lack of victory for tolerance of homosexual acts. The issue is left open for
debate and neo-liberal, individual success, which raises the issue of life enjoyment 255  irrespective of the existence of specific
sexual legal rights. 256
C. Obscenity Laws and the Collective Interest in Sexual Policing
Obscenity laws have been used to promote a conservative agenda and it seems that they will continue to fulfill this role. Even
if the Court “step [ped] in and play[ed] its traditional role as enlightened conservator of the social interest in ordered stability,
and ... str[uc]k down,” 257  for example, sodomy laws, the Court shows no sign that it will decriminalize obscenity. 258  This
will be true at least as long as obscenity continues to be seen to unleash, in the *631  words of Thomas Grey, “the great and
mysterious anti-social force of sexuality.” 259
In the name of morality, 260  public order, and tranquility, obscenity laws police the most benign forms of sexuality 261 --art,
whether in print, on celluloid, or live. 262  As shown below, federal and state courts, as well as legislatures, are embattled in
controlling individual forms of sexual expression.
Obscenity, such as a visual representation of a sexual assault accompanied by the performer stripping to the waist and smearing
chocolate on her breasts, is described as a social wrong because it purportedly violates “general standards of decency and respect
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for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” 263  Fortunately, in the above case, the guilty artist, Finley, was only
denied public funding 264  and not liberty, as had often happened since the early nineteenth century. 265
In 1821, for example, in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 266  the Massachusetts Supreme Court charged the defendant, a printer
and publisher, with publishing a “lewd and obscene” book. 267  The Court defined obscenity by three criteria. 268  Accordingly,
it found the publication obscene because it: 1) debauched and “corrupt[ed] the morals of youth” as well as other good *632
citizens; 269  2) constituted a disturbance of the peace; 270  and 3) was the product of the defendant's evil 271  intent. The court
sentenced the defendant to a jail term “which [did] not extend to life.” 272
The passage to the twentieth century was marked by other, similar decisions that aimed at protecting the community from
sexuality. Between 1821 and 1870, other publications were found obscene. 273  One was deemed obscene for describing methods
of birth control 274  and another for depicting other sexual facts of life. 275  Soon afterward, judges, such as Judge Learned
Hand, became crusaders against obscenity in the name of community standards. In United States v. Kennerley, 276  Judge Hand
created the community standards criterion for determining obscenity. 277  Accordingly, Justice Hand enlarged the scope of
obscenity rules. From the previous standard of safety, which stated that what was safe for children was safe for adults, the current
application of the rules protects the community at large, 278  according to the standards of a hypothetical “average man.” 279
This standard and the “whole book” standard for obscenity prosecutions first appeared in United States v. One Book Entitled
“Ulysses.” 280
In One Book Entitled “Ulysses,” the court held that the book at issue should “be tested by the court's opinion as to its effect [in
its entirety] on a person with average sex instincts.” 281  This test replaced the previous one that instructed juries to “consider
whether [depictions or descriptions were] obscene, or lewd, or lascivious to any considerable portion of the community, *633
or whether they excite[d] impure desires in the minds of the boys and girls or other persons who [were] susceptible to such impure
thoughts and desires.” 282  During the next couple of decades, the Supreme Court applied those standards and homogenized the
national application of obscenity rules. In 1957, the Supreme Court redefined the obscenity test in Roth v. United States. 283
In Roth, 284  the Court defined obscenity in connection to a collective interest in policing sex. 285  The new standard for the
analysis of materials alleged to be obscene was “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal[ed] to prurient interests.” 286  Like the old test, Roth held that actual
harm need not occur and that obscenity was to be judged by its tendency to arouse sexual thoughts. The Court defined sex as
“a great and mysterious motive force in human life, [that] has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind
through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern.” 287  Perhaps weighed down by too much
mystery, the Court departed from the criminal law canons of punishing acts and came closer to defining obscenity as a crime
of the mind. 288  As Justice Douglas underlined in his dissenting opinion, obscenity had become a crime of thoughts. 289  Under
obscenity standards, punishment was meted out for the thoughts provoked by [the defendant's] innocent acts 290  of mailing and
not for the overt acts or antisocial conduct caused by those acts. 291
*634  The evolution of obscenity discourse shows how courts became active promoters of conservative social change. They
seem to have chosen this role because, as Justice Harlan stated in his concurring opinion in Roth, “Congress ha[d] no substantive
power over sexual morality.” 292  Roth's puritanical approach, in fact, translated or answered American society's intolerance for
sexual discourse. It criminalized selling books that “tend[ed] to stir sexual impulses and lead to sexually impure thoughts,” 293
even when the work was not necessarily “utterly without redeeming social importance.” 294
Two decades later, perhaps in an effort to mirror changes in social mores, the Supreme Court purported to relax its standard
in Miller v. California. 295  In Miller, the Court upheld the defendant's conviction for unsolicited mass mailing of sexually
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explicit materials in violation of the California Penal Code. 296  Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed the principle that obscenity
was unprotected by the First Amendment and that community standards should be applied to determine what constitutes
obscenity. 297  Under Miller, a book was deemed obscene if was wholly without redeeming value 298  and not if it stirred impure
thoughts. 299  Miller's guidelines for identifying obscenity are:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 300
It is worth noting that this three-prong test under which both the average person and the law must find the respective work
obscene and without other *635  merit 301  has barely evolved since the first prosecution of obscenity in 1821. 302  Moreover,
little has changed in the conservative role obscenity discourse has consistently promoted in both the courts and legislative bodies.
Justice Harlan's fear of a Congress powerless in the realm of sexual morality, 303  arguably, proved unsubstantiated. For example,
in 1873, Congress passed the first criminal obscenity statute designed “for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of,
obscene Literature and Articles of immoral Use.” 304  Despite being often judicially upheld (including once by Learned Hand
in United States v. One Package), 305  Congress finally repealed the Comstock Act that prohibited importing contraceptive
devices in 1971. 306
Congress did not stop there. As shown below, it positioned itself as a crusader on the forefront of policing sexuality. For
example, in 1996, it passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 307  which criminalized using any computer network to
display “indecent” material unless the content provider uses an “effective” method to restrict access to that material by anyone
under the age of eighteen. 308  Shortly afterward, the Supreme Court intervened and declared the statute unconstitutional. 309  In
Reno v. ACLU, the Court held that CDA's “indecent transmission” and “patently offensive display” provisions *636  abridge
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, as CDA fails to provide any definition of “indecent” and omits any
requirement that “patently offensive” material lack socially redeeming value. 310
The Court balanced the need to keep the Internet as an inexpensive method of communication 311  with the “congressional goal
of protecting minors from potentially [obscenely] harmful materials.” 312  This time, individuals' interest in using the Internet
prevailed because “the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials,” 313  which corresponds in this
analysis to the collective right to police sexuality, was vaguely tailored. 314  Implicitly, the Court recognized one's right to
“Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene.” 315
In 1998, Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) 316  as a follow-up to the Supreme Court's invalidation of
CDA. The COPA sought to shield minors from the commercial proliferation of pornographic material on adult websites. 317  The
law called for criminal penalties for the commercial distribution of “material that is harmful to minors” 318  on the world wide
web and required website operators to confirm the age and identity of its visitors or face criminal and civil penalties. 319  Thus,
COPA contains two major changes from CDA that address the Court's concerns. It only targets, first, commercial websites 320
and, second, material that is “harmful to minors.” 321  The latter is statutorily defined according to the Court's own definition
of obscenity in Miller v. California, 322  which relies on “contemporary community standards.” 323
*637  In 1998, a federal district court found COPA unconstitutional and issued a preliminary injunction barring its
enforcement. 324  Eventually, in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 325  the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further
examination by the lower court while it maintained the injunction against enforcement. 326
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Continuing its fearless, although somewhat impotent, sexual policing of free expression, Congress also enacted the Children's
Internet Protection Act (CIPA) and the Neighborhood Internet Protection Act (NCIPA). 327  The CIPA conditions schools'
and libraries' federal funding on the installation of filtering software that would purportedly screen out potentially obscene
materials. 328  The CIPA became effective on April 20, 2001 329  and almost immediately started its battle for survival in courts.
On May 31, 2002, a federal district court declared it unconstitutional. 330
As of November 2000, five states had passed filtering legislation and another nineteen were debating it. 331  The federal statute
put pressure on public libraries as well as on state universities to use filtering software to restrict access to all who use university
computers, including faculty members and researchers. 332  In addition, the statute placed restrictions on the use of state-owned
computers by state employees in general. 333  It also increased pressure to place filters on elementary and secondary schools. 334
This witch *638  hunt was apparently triggered by events like those that took place in Broward County, Florida. The Broward
County Library was sued on grounds that “male patrons, both grown men and underaged boys used the public library for
immoral and illegal purposes.” 335
Because the statute denied both adults and minors' on-line access to potentially protected speech, libraries, web site publishers,
the American Civil Liberties Union, and others attacked it in court. 336  The court admitted that it is currently impossible, given
the Internet's size, rate of growth, rate of change, and architecture, to develop a filter that neither underblocks nor overblocks
a substantial amount of speech. 337  The court also stated that the filtering software mandated by CIPA would block access to
substantial amounts of constitutionally protected speech, the suppression of which serves no legitimate government interest. 338
Accordingly, because there were alternative means of achieving the legitimate, legislative goal--preventing dissemination of
harmful material for minors--and since the statutory request for a public library's use of software filters was not narrowly tailored
to further any of the state interests, the federal district court held the statute unconstitutional. 339  On June 23, 2003, the Supreme
Court held CIPA unconstitutional. 340
It is worth noting that this type of restrictive legislation, although abundant, does not reflect a majority, conservative view.
Statistics show that those that dislike individual freedom of sexual expression, either for religious *639  or political reasons,
are in the minority. 341  Only forty-three percent of republicans, thirty-six percent of democrats, and thirty-five percent of
independent voters favor such restrictions when adults are involved. 342
*640  Obscenity discourse has historically promoted conservative goals by preserving and expanding the criminalization of
public expression deemed obscene. Presently, laws only criminalize this form of expression. Since they do not appear to answer
the majority view, these laws seem to foster political interests, such as legitimizing political actors within conservative enclaves.
This could be the reason that former President Clinton, who had his own encounters with sexual legal discourse, nevertheless
signed CIPA into law as part of the year-end spending bill. 343  The statute was supposed to represent “an attempt to protect
[the] children [that have access to computers] from pornography on the Internet.” 344
D. Megan's Laws and the Collective Interest in Sexual Policing
If legal discourse regarding obscenity can be described as discounting liberal demands on behalf of communal moral
standards, 345  the next sexual legal discourse annihilated any demands for individual rights on behalf of communal anxieties
and political fears of appearing unsympathetic.
The so-called “community notification statutes” 346  are one of the most recent examples of relentless (and successful) use of
sexual legal discourse to pursue a conservative social agenda. Their benefit had been so aggressively marketed 347  that federal
legislators spent little time arguing the virtues of this very regressive law. 348  As Pratt pointed out in his work, these laws
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answer *641  mostly collective anxieties and, of course, pre-September 11, the only collective need of the moment--sexual
policing. 349
Easily passed at the federal and state level, 350  these statutes require that local communities where sex offenders relocate at
the end of their prison term be notified. 351  Collectively referred to as “community notification statutes” or “sexual predator
laws,” these require internet registry that only contains negative information about the offenders and do not mention any
rehabilitation. 352  Despite any statistical support, these laws assume that sex offenders are more likely to reoffend than
other criminals. 353  During the federal congressional debate, “The single most common dehumanizing term used to describe
convicted sex offenders was ‘sexual predators.’ It was used as a metaphor, comparing the actions of animals that hunt and
kill other animals to sexual offenders' pursuit and sexual victimization of children.” 354  The related federal law is known
as “Megan's Law” 355  in memory of Megan Kanka. Megan was raped and murdered by a twice-convicted pedophile living
anonymously across the street in her New Jersey neighborhood. 356  The 1996 “Megan's Law” (and its state counterparts) 357
requires America's 386,000 convicted sex criminals to register their whereabouts with the police who, in turn, inform the
public. 358  In approximately thirty states, these lists have been posted on the Internet “sometimes with accompanying pictures
and street-maps. In many states, the police are also required to go door-to-door to warn people when a high-risk, former sex
offender moves in.” 359  Supporters of these methods believe that by knowing the history of the individuals that come into a
community, the community can better defend its young and defenseless members. 360
*642  Indeed, studies show 361  that these laws have empowered communities. 362  This is mostly psychological, as there is
no data to support the assumption that unregistered sex offenders will strike more often than the registered ones. 363  This
empowerment comes at a very high cost to individuals. The offenders, after they have finished their prison terms, have lost
housing 364  and employment. 365  Furthermore, they and their families have often been harassed. 366  In fact, commentators
have noted these nefarious statutory effects on democratic institutions 367  and, even as they support this legislation, that the law:
targets a narrow segment of the criminal-offender population, sex offenders, subjecting them to public shame
and, potentially, vigilante violence. Offenders' names and faces are distributed throughout the community.
Schools send notices home with the children, police mail grainy pictures to anxious neighbors, and an entire
nation peruses sex offender photos on state-operated Web sites. Legislators openly acknowledged that the
provisions' benefits came at significant cost to offenders' privacy and security. 368
It is worth noting that during oral argument in two cases focusing on the Alaska 369  and Connecticut 370  community notification
laws, 371  the positions of the Supreme Court Justices mirrored their conservative views. For example, Justice Ginsburg
questioned the laws' lack of information regarding the rehabilitated offenders. 372  Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand,
supported the idea that a dangerous offender “deserves stigmatization,” 373  even when the *643  offender was a “17-year-old
convicted on statutory rape charges for having a consensual sexual relationship with a 14-year-old.” 374
Megan's Laws thrive on the back of a political witch-hunt that depicts sex offenders as “beasts” 375  and “monsters” 376
undeserving of legal protection. This is not necessarily borne out by the statistics. Figures released in “1994 show that by 1997
only 78 (or 2.5%) of the 3,138 rapists released from prison had gone on to rape again. 377  Meanwhile, one in five of those
released after serving sentences for assault and murder had attacked another victim.” 378  Furthermore, there is no data that
Megan's Laws really shield children from sex offenses. 379  However, policing sexuality seems more of an interest to our present
society than, for example, finding solutions for stopping the growing divide between the haves and the have-nots. 380  Again,
this sexual discourse, like obscenity, has been hijacked in its totality to sponsor a conservative agenda and buttress conservative
social change while liberals and their demands are scared away.
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IV. Sexual Harassment and the Collective Interest In Sexual Policing
If obscenity laws, for example, promote general sexual policing by criminalizing all public conduct deemed obscene, the law
of sexual harassment promotes a more limited collective interest--that of policing all sexuality in the work place. 381  If the
obscenity discourse is overtly sponsored to ensure conservative change, the law of sexual harassment, on the other hand, is
overtly sponsored to achieve gender equality in the workplace and its conservative social effects--an asexual workplace where
all sexual behavior is equated with illegal behavior--seem to be utterly disregarded.
*644  From the beginning, sexual harassment laws seem to have benefitted from the ubiquitous nature of the word “sex.”
Sex meaning gender, 382  as in feminine versus masculine, came to cover sexual behavior. 383  The term “sex” soon became
ubiquitous and covered gender--perhaps for legitimacy purposes--as well as sexual behavior.
Under sexual harassment law, an employer's policy or acquiescence in the practice of compelling female employees to submit
to the sexual advances of male supervisors is unlawful 384  “on the ground that it creates an artificial barrier to employment or
advancement which is placed before one gender and not the other, despite the fact that both genders are similarly situated.” 385
Thus, workplace harassment of a sexual nature 386  was born as a group-defined injury that was suffered by women because
of their sex 387  and became a well-established form of gender discrimination. 388  Ironically, because of its sexual content, it
eventually became easier to prove sexual harassment than gender discrimination. 389  Even more ironic, although its content
is wrongful sexual behavior, the law of sexual harassment is not part of any guide to America's sex laws. 390  However, the
substance of sexual harassment law is strictly related to sex as an activity (or verb) 391  and its goal is to police sexuality at work.
The first Supreme Court decision to favorably decide a claim of sexual harassment was Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 392
The unanimous opinion written by the archconservative Justice Rehnquist 393  incorporated the radical *645  views of Professor
Catharine MacKinnon. 394  It is interesting to note that Justice Rehnquist's political activism 395  and judicial record do not stand
for gender equality in the workplace, but do favor sexual policing. 396
Catharine MacKinnon's Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court 397  summarized her views and helped create this new area
in the law. 398  As shown below, this new legal arena helped forge a conservative social agenda, which inevitably legitimizes
fears of sex as verb (and desire).
Of course, policing sexuality at work--to the extent that it means to fight a hostile work environment 399 --is truly commendable.
A hostile work environment, however, is illegal irrespective of content, 400  whether sexual or not. Thus, in the present, sexually-
conservative climate, what sexual harassment law seems to bring is only more social stigma for sexuality.
MacKinnon envisaged the law against sexual harassment as a remedy for the “group” injury of the heterosexual women; for
the first time, she noted, “women have defined women's injuries in a law” 401  and sexual harassment became advanced as
a way to ensure “equality” -within-the-work-place discourse. 402  With Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of
Sex Discrimination, 403  MacKinnon became the promoter of a compelling case for *646  sexual harassment as a form of
gender discrimination. Within her work, “sex” in “sexual harassment” covered both the gender of the victim and the content
of the wrong. 404  In fact, her theory ultimately conflating sex and sexism 405  prevailed, despite some modifications. 406
MacKinnon argued that sexual harassment enforces “Practices which express and reinforce the social inequality of women
to men” 407  thus employs heterosexual “subordination” stereotypes--“Unwanted sexual advances made simply because she
has a woman's body.” 408  With this theory in place, courts and legislatures 409  began treating sexual harassment as gender
discrimination. 410  In 1986, ten years after its legal inception, Catherine MacKinnon acknowledged that sexual harassment as
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sex-based discrimination was legally established. 411  Since then, “sex-based discrimination” has come to mean discrimination
that is illegal because it is gender-based and it covers sexual behavior. 412
In its present form, the law of sexual harassment is both a judicial and statutory construct. It is covered by federal gender
discrimination legislation--Title VII--through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 413  and various state statutes. 414  Under the federal
statute, it is unlawful for an employer “to ... refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or *647  privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex.” 415  Basically, sexual harassment is “quid pro quo” when one makes sexual demands in exchange for
employment opportunities 416  and “hostile environment harassment,” 417  which covers misconduct that is “sufficiently severe
and pervasive to constitute sexual harassment.” 418  In the words of Professor Franke,
Three principal justifications have emerged for considering workplace sexual harassment a violation of Title VII...: “(1) it is
conduct that would not have been undertaken but for the plaintiff's sex; (2) it is conduct that violates Title VII precisely because
it is sexual in nature; and (3) it is conduct that sexually subordinates women to men. 419
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 420  the Supreme Court held that “Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.” 421  The sexual harassment in
this case primarily consisted of a voluntary sexual relationship between a male supervisor and female subordinate that covered
fifty to sixty instances of sexual intercourse which ended when the respondent became involved in a steady relationship. 422
But the fact that sex-related conduct was “voluntary,” in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against
her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. 423  Justice Rehnquist adds that “The gravamen
of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.”’ 424
*648  Lower courts also use “sex” interchangeably to mean both gender and sexual behavior. 425  However, courts seem to
distinguish between the wrongful conduct, which they describe as being of sexual content, and the reason for its illegality,
which they describe as being the gender of the plaintiff. 426
In those cases, courts perceive the victim's gender as the “weakest link” in need of legal protection. 427  In Zabkowicz v. West
Bend Co., 428  for example, the court stated that “the sexually offensive conduct and language used would have been almost
irrelevant and would have failed entirely in its crude purpose had the plaintiff been a man.” 429  The offensive and abusive
language at issue took place during the plaintiff's employment as a warehouse worker in Oak Creek, Wisconsin at the beginning
of the 1980s. 430  The perceived harassment started with a conversation initiated by one of the plaintiff's co-workers, a relative
of her husband, who asked her whether she was wearing a bra. 431  The climax of the perceived harassment was reached in
1982--not when the plaintiff “was pregnant and under a 25-pound lifting restriction” and another male co-worker “allegedly
grabbed his crotch and remarked [that the plaintiff would] ‘have trouble handling this 25-pounder,”'but when the plaintiff, three
days before starting her medical leave of absence on April 26, 1982, observed several of her co-employees celebrating what
they called “her imminent departure.” 432  That celebration caused the plaintiff to break into tears and, shortly afterward, file a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 433
There are also situations when both sexual and non-sexual conduct constitute sexual harassment. For example, in Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 434  the harasser often addressed plaintiff with language such as “You're a woman, what do you know?” 435
or you are “a dumb ass woman.” 436  In addition, it was suggested that she “go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [her] raise.” 437
The Court refused to provide a mathematical test for defining actionable sexual harassment, but, in writing the majority opinion,
Justice O'Connor stated:
TEMPEST IN A TEACUP OR THE MYSTIQUE OF SEXUAL LEGAL DISCOURSE, 38 Gonz. L. Rev. 601
 © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17
*649  [W]e can say that whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” can be determined only by looking at
all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant
to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like
any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. 438
Finally, there have been instances where simple, gender-based disparaging comments constituted the illegal misconduct.
Nonsexual, gender-based conduct may be harassing, for example, when male employees are called “men” and female employees
“girls.” 439
Sexual harassment law, which became legitimized as gender discrimination 440  either as a form of female subordination
or violence against women, 441  evolved to cover any instance that might make a woman uncomfortable. Currently, sexual
harassment law seems to thrive in its repressive results for stigmatizing sex as a verb and desire. 442
Sexual harassment jurisprudence proves to be “working surprisingly well for women by any standards, particularly when
compared with the rest of sex [gender] discrimination law.” 443  The fact that victims are not held to the same demands of proof
as in any other tort case 444  clearly helps.
It is true that MacKinnon's theory of sexual harassment broke with its restrictive, heterosexual approach emphasizing female
sexual subordination. From “Sexual harassment [as] a clear social manifestation of male privilege incarnated in the male sex role
that supports coercive sexuality reinforced by *650  male power over the job,” 445  sexual harassment incorporates same-sex
harassment claims, such as those in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 446  Thus, concrete forms of sexual harassment
have been held to victimize both heterosexual and homosexual workers. 447  As Professor Franke observed, MacKinnon's
“group injury” is not limited to women anymore. 448  However, the dominant conclusion is that sexual harassment remains sex
(meaning gender) discrimination. 449  Sexual harassment claims continue to be part of gender discrimination, 450  even in the
form of “sexual orientation discrimination.” 451  Some scholars deplore this obsession with sexual conduct as a form of gender-
based harassment, 452  despite the fact that the importance of distinguishing “between the two constructs” “sex” and “gender”
has become widely accepted. 453  On the other hand, there are scholars who differentiate between “sex harassment” 454  and
“sexual harassment” 455  and further the debate whether “sex” in Title VII refers to “a class of human activity” 456  or “the
identity category.” 457  Even courts have started to distinguish between “sexually oriented harassment” 458  and gender-based
harassment. 459
While sexual harassment legislation promotes legitimizing any type of sexual behavior as a social wrong, 460  it competes for
positive effects with the hostile work environment tort. 461  If all “Offensive behavior not only degrades *651  subordinate
employees, [but] it [also] constitutes a misuse of government time and property,” 462  some sexual discourse is “benign” 463
and, as Professor Vicki Schultz noted, should not be suppressed and controlled in the name of gender equality. 464  Furthermore,
even words that may sound sexual, as with MacKinnon's example of being called a “fucking cunt,” 465  sometimes have a
neutral, harassing meaning that could be constrained accordingly. In other words, “fucking” is not Justice O'Connor's “dangling
modifier,” 466  but a meaningful direct, modifier of the vulgar denomination of the female sexual organ--“cunt.”
Policing sex at work, while not necessarily a bad idea, 467  has caused a collective, anti-sexual hysteria 468  based on gender
revenge. 469  It has also helped discredit sexual expression while validating old beliefs of sex as a means of subordination and
exploitation. 470  Oddly enough, the law of sexual harassment has proved helpful to a conservative agenda of banishing any
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hint of sexuality from the workplace--e.g., employees being fired on accusations of “show[ing] a dictionary definition of the
word ‘clitoris' to a female co-worker.” 471
*652  V. Conclusion
Whether its pervasiveness stems from a much-needed social distraction similar to that of the gladiator shows in Roman times, 472
a desire for inclusiveness--promoting new individual rights such as same-sex marriages--or a need for social control that explains
irrational, seven-year prison sentences for keeping a fictional diary about child pornography, 473  sexuality is a pervasive part
of our public discourse.
In the political sphere, the Clinton administration, for example, became tarred by an impeachment 474  dominated by the legal
definition of sexual intercourse between a male president and a female intern. 475  The 2000 elections were heavily fought in the
shadow of sexual issues and the choice between the democratic and republican presidential candidates was partially determined
by their stances on reproductive rights. 476  Currently, we live in a political climate that uses sexual issues to inculcate socially
conservative change under the influence of a conservative religious right. 477
This article suggests that the pervasiveness of sexual legal discourse stems from its usefulness in promoting limited social
change for both liberals and conservatives. Its non-political, slippery nature makes it a kind of universal solvent that can be
used to contain any situation or agenda. While political eye *653  candy, sexuality is not geared to generate any change that
would shake the basic social or political structure. Furthermore, sexual legal discourse lends itself naturally as the political
choice of the day in promoting social change. It only enables incremental changes or “incrementalism, which liberals have
eagerly embraced.” 478  However, as James Donovan recently noted, incrementalism is “less ‘improvement’ and no ‘progress' by
reducing clarity and increasing imprecision. If the statement of the goal is accurate, one must choose the wholesale ‘leaps.”’ 479
Indeed, the liberal changes resemble the results once achieved by casting all African-Americans, led by Dorothy Dandridge,
in the 1954 Hollywood production of Bizet's Carmen called Carmen Jones. 480  It may have shocked mainstream sensibilities
at the time; however, the movie won a Golden Globe award and Dandridge was nominated for an Oscar for best-performance-
by-an-actress. 481  Using the Oscar awards as the standard for major achievements in the business, in 2002, Halle Berry was
the first African-American actress to receive an Oscar. 482  Similarly, liberals should be aware of the limitations that come with
using a legal discourse that has always enabled conservatives to achieve their own chimera of order--using sexually-oriented
legislation only limited demands for liberal social change may be satisfied.
As both verb and desire, sex reaches across different social classes and creeds. And, of course, everyone has an opinion about
sex, whether moral or religious, and, in most cases, that opinion inhibits sex. As a result, sexual legal discourse has become the
only democratic discourse in America. Finally, everybody has an equal vote against sex.
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unmistakable discrimination.” Id. at 541. The Act required compulsory sterilization of “habitual criminals,” defined as two or more
times convicted felons of “crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude.”’ Id. (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 57 § 1935).
113 See generally, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
114 See id. at 486.
115 Id. at 485-86.
116 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
117 Id. at 867.
118 381 U.S. at 485.
119 Sam Howe Verhovek, Idaho: Anti-Abortion Bill Enacted, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 2001, at A12.
Gov. Dirk Kempthorne has signed a bill eliminating state financing of health-related abortions for poor women, saying it will protect
“the lives of unborn children.” Critics say it will just spark a legal battle, pointing to a 1994 court ruling that prompted the state to
pay for health-related abortions under Medicaid. Abortions, meanwhile, are declining in Idaho: there were 867 in 1999, a record
low since reporting began in 1977, the state said. The peak was 1981, with 2,706.
Id.
120 E.g., Idaho Code § 18-612 (Michie 1997).
Refusal to Perform Abortions - Physicians and hospitals not liable.
Nothing in this act shall be deemed to require any hospital to furnish facilities or admit any patient for any abortion if, upon
determination by its governing board, it elects not to do so.
Id.
121 Dworkin, supra note 29, at 266.
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122 It is interesting to note that so-called socialist countries, such as Romania, and more liberal capitalist countries like the United
Kingdom and capitalist countries with a powerful Christian lobby, the United States for example, have used and encouraged the
use of law as a tool to change behavior. Jane Lewis, Debates and Issues Regarding Marriage and Cohabitation in the British and
American Literature, 15 Int'l J. L. Pol'y & Fam. 159, 174-75 (2001) (discussing the relationship between law and behavior, generally,
and the role of U.K. and U.S. law in facilitating and legitimizing certain kinds of behavior).
123 See id.
124 Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 923, 1019 (1991).
125 For a discussion on the role of law, see Davis & Neacsu, supra note 30, at 735-36 (“It is almost tautological to say that law is mere
superstructure. On the other hand, it is highly contestable, because within the claim that law is superstructure is the implication that
law changes nothing and that to change the law changes nothing else.”) (citations omitted).
126 See Dworkin, supra note 29, at 266.
127 Sex-related legislation is obviously the product of “legislated morality.” Regarding the intertwined relationship between law and
morality, see Welch, supra note 31, at 543.
We have learned that we can “legislate morality.” If morality is viewed simplistically as the way people behave, then law obviously
shapes morality. When we act on decisions about what we ought to do, the legal “ought” plays a major role in the choices we make. ...
The weight of societal judgment, expressed through the law, is inevitably felt as we develop our individual perspectives.
Id.
128 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
129 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140-41 (1973).
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the
19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way,
a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect
to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present in
this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured
in early pregnancy.
Id.; see also James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900, 3 (1978).
130 Roe, 410 U.S. at 147-51.
131 Wayne C. Bartee & Alice Fleetwood Bartee, Litigating Morality: American Legal Thought and Its English Roots, 6 (1992)
(summarizing the history of the common law abortion right).
132 Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony, or even a lesser crime, at common law is still disputed. Bracton, writing early in the
thirteenth century, considered abortion by blow or poison as homicide “if the foetus be already formed or animated, and especially
if it be animated, he commits homicide.” Id. at 12. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 132. “It is undisputed that at common law, abortion
performed before ‘quickening'-the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th
week of pregnancy-was not an indictable offense.” Id.
133 Quickening, a phenomenon associated with normal gestation, established the beginning of the fetus's existence for criminal purposes.
See Mohr, supra note 129, at 3.
134 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 148.
135 See id.
136 Id. at 147-51.
137 Id.
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138 Waldron, supra note 106, at 305 (2000).
139 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 184 (1991); see also Dershowitz, supra note 94,
at 192 (“Between 1967 and 1971, under mounting pressure from the women's rights movement, 17 states decriminalized abortion.”).
140 See id.
141 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
142 Id. at 480.
143 Id. at 485-86; David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 131 (1994) (telling
the plaintiff's full story).
144 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
145 Id.
146 405 U.S. 438 (holding that Massachusetts' statute permitting married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to single persons for that purpose violated the Equal Protection Clause).
147 Id. at 453; see also The Abortion Controversy: A Documentary History 119 (Eva Rubin ed., 1994) [hereinafter The Abortion
Controversy].
148 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
149 The Abortion Controversy, supra note 147, at 120.
150 Id. at 131; see generally Garrow, supra note 143, at 473.
151 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152 The Abortion Controversy, supra note 147, at 131.
153 Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
154 Id. at 120.
155 Id. at 129.
156 See id. at 166.
157 See id. at 152; U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”).
158 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
159 The Abortion Controversy, supra note 147, at 119.
160 381 U.S. 479, 484, 486 (1965).
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161 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
162 See id. at 162-63.
163 Id. at 163.
164 See id. at 139-40.
165 Id. at 154.
166 See e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 94, at 193. (“Roe. v. Wade helped secure the presidency for Ronald Reagan by giving him a ‘free’
issue.”).
167 See id. For a recent summary of legal issues related to the fetus' viability, see Bruce Ching, Inverting the Viability Test for Abortion
Law, 22 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 37, 37-45 (2000).
168 It is interesting to note that conservatives have yet to discover and fight for the right to life of those living on death row.
169 With the latest technological developments that ensure the viability of fetuses aborted in the last trimester, the issue of perceiving
fetuses as individuals may even transcend the theoretical realm. See, e.g., Roy Rivenburg, Partial Truths In the PR War Over a Form
of Late-Term Abortions, Both Sides Are Guilty of Manipulating the Facts: Here's What They Are (and Aren't) Saying, L.A. Times,
April 2, 1997, at E-1; see also Karen E. Walther, Partial-Birth Abortion: Should Moral Judgment Prevail Over Medical Judgment?,
31 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 693 (2000).
170 Mohr, supra note 129, at 261.
171 See id.
172 Walther, supra note 169, at 693.
173 Dershowitz, supra note 94, at 193.
174 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 833-34.
177 Id. at 878.
178 Id. at 833.
179 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
180 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
181 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-78.
182 David M. Smolin, Fourteenth Amendment Unenumerated Rights Jurisprudence: An Essay in Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 815, 816 (2001).
183 Id.
184 Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at n.8.
185 Stevens and Blackmun. Id. at n.9.
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186 505 U.S. at 877.
187 Id. at 876.
188 Id. at 882.
189 Id.
190 Id. For a discussion of different constitutional standards, see Debra L. Moore, Don't Rush to Judgment on “Dolly”: Human Cloning
and Its Individual Procreative Liberty Implications, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 425, 442-43 (1997).
191 Lynne Marie Kohm & Colleen Holmes, The Rise and Fall of Women's Rights: Have Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom Forfeited
Victory?, 6 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 381, 400-01 (2000); Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 Colum. J. Gender
& L. 119, 120 n.5 (1992).
192 410 U.S. 113 (1973).




197 Dershowitz, supranote 94, at 193.
198 Kohm & Holmes, supra note 191, at 400.
199 Mohr, supranote 129, at 253.
200 For a discussion on the impact of the Justices' ideology on the decisions that they make and thus on Supreme Court decisional law,
see Epstein & Knight, supra note 65. See also Dershowitz, supranote 94, at 142 (making the case that the Justices decided Bush v.
Gore based on their ideology and not on the law).
201 See The Supreme Court of the United States: It's Beginnings and Its Justices 1790-1991 (Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter heard argument in Casey and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
Burger, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stewart heard argument in Roe v. Wade).
202 See supra discussion on Casey.
203 See supra note 101.
204 See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 129, at 250-63 (discussing the potential social reasons for the pro-abortion changes); see also Rosenberg,
supra note 139.
205 The public opinion seems to be favorable of abortion rights. The following table shows attitudes toward abortion:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1998 169 (Kathleen Maguire et al., eds., 1999).
206 Id.
207 Id.
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208 See supra, note 17.
209 See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1432-43, n.4 (1992) (noting the “problematic
persistence” of the religious word “sodomy” in conjunction with the medical term “homosexual” and explaining the “parasitic
relationship” between the two terms--“sodomy,” impregnated with religious, moral meaning (see the city of Sodom), and
“homosexual,” which is of secular and more recent provenience as another example of the “regnant biases” that are found in Bowers).
For an analysis of the term “sodomy,” see the Supreme Court case of Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
210 Christopher S. Hargis, Romer, Hurley, and Dale: How the Supreme Court Languishes with “Special Rights,” 89 Ky. L.J. 1189,
1193 (2000-2001).
211 Id.
212 Gary Chartier, Natural Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics of Virtue, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1593, 1604 (2001) (“What is morally
objectionable about homosexual acts [pleasure] is also what is wrong with contracepted vaginal heterosexual intercourse, nonvaginal
heterosexual intercourse, masturbation, and adultery.”).
213 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 200. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Thomas, supra note 209, at 1432, n.3.
216 As Professor Thomas stated, “This is an appropriate point ... to note the problematic persistence ... of the [religious] word ‘sodomy’ ...
[in conjunction with] the medical term ‘homosexual.”’ Thomas, supra note 209, at 1432-33, n.4.
217 Id.
218 Ga. Code. Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984).
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another...
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years....
Id.
219 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
220 Id.
221 Roger J. Magnuson, Are Gay Rights Right? Making Sense of the Controversy, 94 (1990).
222 See, Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White 310 (1998) (explaining that, despite his Democratic political
orientation, Justice White's philosophy and voting record were conservative).
223 Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judicial Argument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L.
Rev. 893, 902; Allan Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Enigmatic Fifth Vote and the Reasonableness of Moral Certitude, 49 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 93 (1992).
224 Magnuson, supra note 221, at 94; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. On Justice White's use of precedent for “argumentative,
rhetorical, or even partisan purposes,” see Eskridge, supra note 9, at 665.
225 Angus Campbell & Kenneth Norrie, Homosexual Rights in Romer v. Evans: Animus Averted, 27 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 285, 292
(1998).
226 Blackmun attacked this position when he stated that “[T]he fact that moral judgments expressed by statutes ... may be ‘natural and
familiar ... ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of
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the United States.”’ Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986); see also Mark E. Papadopoulos, Note, Inkblot Jurisprudence:
Romer v. Evans as a Great Defeat for the Gay Rights Movement, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 165, 172 (1997).
227 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
228 Id. at 186.
229 Id.
230 Thomas, supra note 209, at 1432 n.4.
231 Id.
232 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
233 The court found that the mixed-sex requirement for civil marriage violated the Common Benefits Clause of the state constitution
and provided that the legislature was to accommodate same-sex couples with the rights and protections extended to married, mixed-
sex couples. Id. at 867; see also David B. Cruz, ‘Just Don't Call It Marriage’: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive
Resource, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 925, 952 (2001).
234 Cruz, supra note 233, at 952.
235 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 1204 (2002).
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Cruz, supra note 233, at 953. Lewis A. Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status, 89 Ky. L.J.
1075 (2000-2001) (noting that the Vermont Legislature has created a “quasi-marital animal: the civil union.”).
239 The Act guarantees all the rights and privileges of married couples. See Dale Carpenter, The Limits of Gaylaw, 17 Const. Comment.
603, 604 (2000); Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A Netherlands-United States Comparison,
18 Ariz. J. Int'l L. & Comp. L. 141, 141-42 (2001); see also Vicki L. Armstrong, Welcome to the 21st Century and the Legalization
of Same-Sex Unions, 18 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 85, 87-88 (2001) (underlining that the benefits conferred on civil marriages and unions
are identical and that civil union is the equivalent of a marriage in Vermont, but for the title and sex of the partners).
240 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
241 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
242 See id.
243 Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
244 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002).
245 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06 (Vernon 2001).
246 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
247 Id. at 202 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
248 Lawrence, 41 S. W.3d at 352-53.
249 Justice Powell wrote:
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I join the opinion of the Court. I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental right --i.e., no substantive right under the Due
Process Clause-- such as that claimed by respondent Hardwick, and found to exist by the Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest,
however, that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in this
case, Ga.Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984), authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act
of sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct--certainly a sentence of long duration--would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring).
250 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
251 Id. at 2480 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
252 Id. at 2484.
253 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court today overrules Bowers....I joined Bowers, and do not join the Court in overruling it.”).
254 Id.
255 For example, in Australia, opinion polls suggest that “most homosexual couples see no need for the status of marriage.” Hon. Michael
Kirby, Law and Sexuality: the Contrasting Case of Australia, 12 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 103, 110 (2001).
256 To view the right to enter into a civil union or marriage in terms of collective, as opposed to individual, rights, see Lynn D. Wardle,
‘Multiply and Replenish’: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 771, 778 (2001) (stating that same-sex marriages should not be legalized because they do not further the same social interests
as heterosexual marriages).
257 Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83, 97 (1980).
258 Id. at 91.
259 Id.
260 See Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391, 394 (1963).
261 Feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin would disagree with the above statement since they see pornographic
material as a type of discrimination that perpetuates a “practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex [gender] which
differentially harms women.” American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F.Supp. 1316, 1320 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). For more information see Hunter et al., supra note 39, at 262 n.3-6.
Thus, MacKinnin & Dworkin believe that policing obscenity protects women's Fourteenth Amendment rights, as pornography
perpetuates women's discrimination on account of their gender. The author disavows such an interpretation of obscenity and simply
views matters of decency as belonging to the moral not legal realm. Such an interpretation does not interfere with the author's analysis
of obscenity viewed only in connection to sex as a verb and not sex as one's gender. In addition, to the extent that pornography
exhausts one's energy or imagination, it is policed for that very reason and legitimized by the community right for sexual tranquility.
262 See generally Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
263 Alison Young, Aesthetic Vertigo and the Jurisprudence of Disgust, 11 Law & Critique 241, 243 (2000); see also Finley, 524 U.S.
at 572.
264 Finley, 524 U.S. at 580-81.
265 Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821).
266 Id.
267 Id.
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268 Id.
269 See Bartee & Bartee, supra note 131, at 62.
270 Those who have studied the history of obscenity-related cases in England and America have found that the charge of “disturbing
the peace” is the oldest criterion used in obscenity proceedings. For example, in London in 1663, Sir Charles Sedley was prosecuted
for “breach of the King's Peace.” His obscene conduct consisted of hurling bottles containing urine on a crowd, naked from his
balcony. Id.; Leo M. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40-43 (1938) (explaining the history and
fallout of Sedley's case).
271 Holmes, 17 Mass. at 340.
272 Id.
273 Bartee & Bartee, supra note 131, at 62.
274 David Tribe, Questions of Censorship 25 (1973) (explaining how, in 1832, Dr. Charles Knowlton was fined and imprisoned for
writing a contraceptive manual entitled The Fruits of Philosophy).
275 Bartee & Bartee, supra note 131, at 62.
276 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
277 Id. at 121.
278 Id. at 120-21.
279 Id. at 121.
280 72 F.2d 705, 707-08 (2nd Cir. 1934).
281 Id.
282 United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1879).
283 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This case actually represents a pair of cases. One involved the prosecution of Samuel Roth under a federal
obscenity statute and the other the prosecution of David Alberts under a California obscenity statute.
284 Id. at 476.
285 Id. at 488-90.
286 Id. at 489. The Court cited the obscenity definition of the A.L.I., Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2): “A thing is obscene if, considered
as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.” Id. at 488.
287 Id. at 487.
288 It is worth noting that there are commentators that think that, in Roth, “the Warren Court used a liberal test that made convictions
for obscenity very difficult to obtain.” Richard L. Pacelle, The Dynamics and Determinants of Agenda Change in the Rehnquist
Court, in Contemplating Courts 263 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
289 United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 507 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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290 United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1956) (holding constitutional the statute declaring “every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
filthy book, pamphlet,” etc. to be “unmailable” and finding no error in the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the meaning
of the word “filthy”).
291 Id. at 804 (Frank, J., concurring).
292 Roth, 354 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., concurring).
293 Id.
294 Id. at 484.
295 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
296 Id. at 36-37.
297 Id.; see also, Mark C. Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political Viability: The Case of Internet Pornography, 25
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 977, 1005 (2002).
298 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. In fact, in the decade preceding Miller, the Court decided fifty-four obscenity cases and only four in the
following decade. Pacelle, supra note 288, at 263.
299 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 507 (1957).
300 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 497 (1985).
301 See Brockett, 472 U.S. at 497; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; A Book Named ‘John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure’ v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
302 Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821).
303 Roth, 354 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
304 Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599 (1873). The driving force behind it was Anthony Comstock, a prominent anti-vice
crusader. Comstock believed that “anything remotely touching upon sex was ... obscene” and, in his diary, referred to the 1873 Act
as “his law.” See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 70 n.19 (1983); Paul S. Boyer, Purity in Print 182-84 (2d. ed.
2002); Heywood Broun & Margaret Leech, Anthony Comstock: Roundsman of the Lord 265 (1927); James C. N. Paul, The Post
Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 UCLA L. Rev. 44, 57 (1961).
305 86 F.2d 737, 740 (1936).
306 For a detailed discussion of the Comstock Act and other, similar legislative acts, see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason, 78-80
(1992).
307 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1996)). Title 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B)
(ii) criminalizes the “knowing” transmission of “obscene or indecent” messages to any recipient under eighteen years of age. 47
U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2001). Section 223(d) prohibits the “knowin[g]” sending or displaying to a person under eighteen of any
message “that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs.” 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (2001). Affirmative defenses are provided for those who take “good
faith, ... effective ... actions” to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications and those who restrict such access by
requiring certain designated forms of proof of age, such as a verified credit card or adult identification number. 47 U.S.C. §223(e)
(5)(A)(B) (2001).
308 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859-60 (1997).
309 Id. at 849.
TEMPEST IN A TEACUP OR THE MYSTIQUE OF SEXUAL LEGAL DISCOURSE, 38 Gonz. L. Rev. 601
 © 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 35
310 Id. at 864-65.
311 Id. at 857.
312 Id. at 871.
313 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
314 Id. at 879.
315 Id. at 874 (quoting Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
316 Eric E. Breisach, Lisa Chandler Cordell & Shari L. Wilkozek, Challenges Facing Cable Online Service Providers, 723 PLI/PAT
729, 762 (2002).
317 Id.
318 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000).
319 47 U.S.C. § 231(a).
320 47 U.S.C.§ 231(e)(2)(A) (2000); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000); see infra text accompanying note 329.
321 47 U.S.C.§ 231(e)(6) (2000); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 223; see infra text accompanying note 329.
322 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973).
323 Id.
324 ACLU v. Reno, 31 F.Supp.2d 473, 477, 497-98 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir 2000), vacated by, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002).
325 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002).
326 Id. For an analysis of Aschroft v. ACLU, see also John W. Borkowski, Alexander E. Dreier & Maya R. Kobersy, The 2001-2002
Term of the United States Supreme Court and Its Impact on Public Schools, 167 Ed. Law Rep. 1, 13-14 (2002); Supreme Court
Update 49 Fed. Law. 43, 43 (2002).
327 Pub. L. No. 106-554, 2763A Stat. 335 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000)); see ACLU Contests,
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